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Defamation in Broadcasting
1. Introduction
The law of defamation is not new to the world, nor limited to certain
nations:
Moses commanded: "Neither shalt thou bear false witness
against thy neighbour." The Far East punished slander. The
Twelve Tables of Rome recognized defamation. Early Anglo-
Saxon and Germanic laws took a serious view of insult by word
or gesture. Punishment included excision of the tongue.
In England, a book on libel was written three hundred years
ago. Under a French ordinance of the past century the publication
of a libel was punished by whipping and on a second offence with
death. '
Obviously, the consequences -have changed over the years, but the
basic responsibility is still present. The early development of the
law of defamation dealt largely with slander, and with libel in a very
limited context - mostly in relation to letters and other similar
communications. The advent of the printing press and the rise of
newspapers saw the law flourish and grow into the large body of
doctrine that we know today. The advent of modem means of
telecommunication brought the scope of that law to unthought of
application in the modem world.
This article will examine the nature of the medium and the
application of the centuries old concepts of defamation to radio and
television broadcasting. The article is by no means exhaustive, as to
cover every aspect of defamation and its application to broadcasting
would be a phenomenal task. Instead, several aspects of the law will
be examined to see how the courts adapted the old concepts to the
new medium and to point out any needed changes in the law. The
relevant legislation in the area and the special problems arising in a
federal state will be examined, namely the constitutional and
conflict of laws problems.
In an effort to keep the paper to a reasonable length, it has been
necessary to assume a general understanding of the law in some of
the areas discussed. Hence, to a large extent the paper does not
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attempt an indepth study of the law but points out its development in
this special field.
II. The Nature of the Problem
As stated above, the law of defamation developed in a period when
the cases arose from words spoken orally and from words printed,
mostly in newspapers and books. Indeed, the law developed two
separate sets of principles to deal with each, the first being slander
and the second being libel, with substantive differences in the law in
each case. The advent of radio, and especially television, destroyed
the traditional distinctions between the two. At common law, libel
was considered to be the more reprehensible of the two, on the
primary basis that it was more permanent in form. However, there
was an additional basis in the fact that the written word achieved a
much wider distribution. 2 While the broadcast word may only be
with us for a fleeting instant, it does achieve a much more
widespread distribution than would a newspaper. In addition, many
broadcasts are taped and do achieve a permanent form. Hence, a
particular broadcast could have aspects in both branches of the law.
Indeed, the courts themselves had difficulty in deciding whether
broadcasts were libel or slander. Some courts held that slander was
applicable - as the words were spoken;3 applying historical
distinctions without considering the special aspects of the media.
Others favoured a law by which the matter constituted libel if it was
broadcast while being read from the script and slander if this was
not the case. 4 Still other courts held that a defamatory broadcast was
libel. 5 This confusion alone demonstrates the difficulty of applying
the established law to the new form of communication. Legislation
in Nova Scotia deems broadcasting of defamatory matter to be
libel. 6
This difficulty must be viewed against the background of the
importance of radio and television in Canada today:
Canadians watch television and listen to radio more than any
other people on earth. Each week the picture tube and the loud
2. See J. S. Williams, The Law of Defamation in Canada (Toronto: Butterworths,
1976) at 55-56
3. Meldrum v.Australian Broadcasting Co. Ltd., [1932] V.L.R. 425 (S.C. Vict.)
4. See C. Gatley, Gatley on Libel and Slander (7th ed. London: Sweet and
Maxwell Ltd., 1974) at 77
5. Gearhart v. W.S.A.Z., Inc. (1957), 150 F. Supp. 98 (U.S.D., Ky.)
6. Defamation Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 72, s.2
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speaker occupy their attention for more hours than most of them
spend earning a living. Broadcasting is changing their lives with
results that will be far reaching for them and their country .
7
This addiction to the broadcasting media should be considered by
the courts in their application of the law to radio and television.
Canadians have become addicts to television and this must shape
their public attitudes - to social life, recreation, and opinions on
public men and our political institutions. Television and the
portrayals given thereon, can create an intense reaction among the
viewers. The law must be able to meet this effect in relation to
defamation actions.
In fact, the law may need to go further and even make a
distinction between radio and television. Radio does not have the
same number of listeners as does T.V., nor will it generally be able
to obtain the same intense reaction or feeling of involvement that
television can achieve. The added effect of the visual image can be
of immense importance in this regard.
There are several other aspects in which distinctions can be made
between traditional means of communication and the broadcast
media. In addition to the fact that broadcasting has the ability to
reach many more people simultaneously, it has the ability to span
borders very easily and hence, people may be affected in various
provinces and even in various states. While not strictly related to
defamation law, it is another problem which will be facing the
courts.
The nature of the broadcast medium places the publisher in a
special field. In a newspaper, the editor has the opportunity to
screen all the material very closely. The broadcaster has not the
same opportunity. A disc-jockey may make an off-hand, ad-lib
remark, a caller on a talk-back show may make a defamatory
statement, or a person in a crowd may hold up a defamatory sign
during broadcast of a live demonstration. The opportunity to
carefully screen such remarks is just not present. To what extent
will the courts hold the broadcaster, the publisher (licensee), or the
employer liable? Again, special consideration should be given to the
nature of the medium.
To conclude, therefore, it is conceivable that the courts should set
different standards and rules for, and even within, the broadcasting
media. There are indications that courts are willing to set special
7. D. Jamieson, The Troubled Air (Fredericton: Brunswick Press, 1966) at 9
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rules where policy requires. For instance, the courts in the United
States had ruled that publishers were protected in situations where
they discussed public officials and that in order to sue for
defamation, such public officials had to show malice (knowledge of
falsity or reckless disregard as to truth) on the part of the publisher.
However, they were willing to set different standards in regard to
private individuals, as they did not place themselves before the
public, nor did they have the same access to the media as did a
public official to rebut the statements. Hence, the states could set
special standards. 8 The next part of this article will examine specific
aspects of the law of defamation, the need for special rules and the
willingness of the courts to set those separate standards.
Ill. Some Selected Topics
1. Pleadings
The rules of pleadings in a defamation action were developed many
years ago and are fairly strict. It was necessary to set out the exact
words complained of in order for the defendant to know what the
case was that he had to meet. The reason for this strict rule was of
course that in such actions everything depended on the words, so
they should be set out expressly. 9 Generally, as well, only the
particular parts of the material complained of were to be specified,
and a claim would be struck out as embarrassing if the whole of an
article was set out and only part of it was relevant to the case. ' 0 The
only time when this did not apply was when the whole of the article
was said to be defamatory," but even here, it appears that the effect
of the material must be set out and the material must not be too
long. 12
The difficulty arises in applying these rules to the broadcasting
media. The problem arose early in the United States and the courts
dealt with the problem by saying that the pleadings were satisfactory
if a factual description of the show and the conclusions of fact were
8. See M. J. Laughlen, "New Standards in Media Defamation Cases: Gerty v.
Robert Welsh, Inc.," (1975-76), 12 Cal. Western L. Rev. 172
9. Harris v. Warre (1879), 4 Comm. P1. 125
10. D.D.S.A. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Times Newspapers Ltd. and Another,
[1972] 3 All E.R. 417 (C.A.)
11. Churchill Forest Industries (Manitoba) Ltd. v. Finkel Bodie et al., [1971] 1
W.W.R. 745 (Man. C.A.)
12. See Comments on Churchill case in Lougheed v. Canadian Corporation
(1978), 4 C.C.L.T. 287 (Alta. S.C., App.Div.)
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set out, together with statements of the way in which the material
was defamatory. 13 The Canadian approach was recently stated in the
Lougheed case, 14 in a rare display of judicial recognition of the
unique character of the medium in the field of defamation.1 5 This
was an application for further particulars, by the C.B.C., in the
claim against it by the Premier of Alberta. The C.B.C. had aired a
show in which the Alberta Sincrude deal was the topic. It was
founded on a factual background of actual events and people and the
actor portraying the role of the Premier used Lougheed's own name.
The learned trial judge first analyzed the rule as it stood and the
nature of the television media. He went on to outline the two major
difficulties confronting the court. On the one hand, was the
difficulty, due to technological developments in audio-visual
presentations, to give a complete description of all the alleged
defamatory elements involved in an hour long play on T.V., while
on the other, was the need to clearly delineate what the claim was to
enable the defendant to present a defense. Broad general allegations
were not enough and the court set out the following rules:
I would therefore hold that the plaintiff, in this case, must go
beyond general allegations of the type that the television play
portrayed him as having been "outmanoeuvred, outsmarted and
outnegotiated by major corporations". The plaintiff must also
give some indication of what scenes are the basis of these
allegations. This is not to say that the plaintiff must go into
painstaking detail of each picture and sound making up the scene.
However, he must indicate to the defendant which parts of this
television play he alleges defame him.
If the plaintiff is relying upon the method portrayal of him by
the actor in the play as being defamatory or contributing to the
alleged defamatory image, he should specify what specific
methods are involved.
If the plaintiff relies upon any innuendo arising out of the play,
again he should specify what, in his opinion is the alleged
innuendo...
If the plaintiff intends to rely upon any impression created by
the background music, . . . he should be able to specify what
there is about the music that creates or helps to create the alleged
defamation. 16
13. Brown v. Paramount Publix Corporation (1934), 270 N.Y.S. 544
(Sup.Ct.App. Div. 3rd Dep't.)
14. Lougheed v. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (1978), 4 C.C.L.T. 287
(Alta. S.C.)
15. See quote from case, infra, note 49
16. Lougheed v. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, supra, note 14 at 309. The
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The court has then, out of necessity, relaxed the rather strict rules of
pleading in relation to broadcasting and has set a separate rule for
the medium. This recognition of the special nature of radio, and
especially television, may be reflected in later cases in different
areas.
2. Injunctions
While it is clear that once libel is established in court, there is
jurisdiction to grant an injunction to prohibit further publication'
7
unless there is no danger of recurrence, 18 What is the situation
where a claimant seeks an injunction to prevent the initial
publication of material which he alleges to be defamatory? The
leading case on this was Bonnard v. Perryman, 19 the ruling of
which was set out and applied in relation to the broadcasting media
in Canada Metal Co. Ltd. et al. v. Canadian Broadcasting
Corporation et. al. as follows:
The Court in a case of this type will only interfere with a
publication of an alleged libel in the very clearest of cases. The
Court must be satisfied that the words are beyond doubt
defamatory, are clearly untrue so that no defense of justification
would succeed and, where such a defense may apply, are not fair
comment on true or admitted facts.
20
Hence, an interlocutory injunction of this nature would only issue
where the court would set aside the verdict of no libel returned by
the jury as being unreasonable. Where a defense is raised and it is
not manifest that the defense is bound to fail, the injunction will be
refused.
2 1
Two reasons are traditionally given for such a strict rule to be
law in relation to innuendo has been that, as material could have many different
meanings, the statement of claim should set out the innuendos claimed. (DDSA
Pharmaceuticals, supra, note 10). The English Court of Appeal, however, seems
to have relaxed the rule somewhat, as they recently stated that if no innuendo was
set out, the court could outline the various meanings a jury might reasonably put
upon the words. (London Computer Operators Training Ltd. and Others v. British
Broadcasting Corporation and Others, [1937] 1 W.L.R. 424 (C.A.). The quote
above seems to stick with the stricter rule. Here, the innuendo appeared to be that
repeated references to the U.S. Watergate scandal throughout the show imputed a
similar wrongdoing here.
17. Hayward & Co. v. Hayward & Sons (1886), 34Ch. D. 198
18. Pryce and Sons Limited v. Pioneer Press Limited (1923), 42 T.L.R. 29
(K.B.D.)
19. [189112Ch. 269 (C.A.)
20. (1974), 3 0.R. (2d) I at 16(H.C.)
21. Fraser v. Evans, [1969] 1 All E.R. 8 (C.A.)
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applied. The first is that the courts show a strong desire not to
interfere with the basis of the Anglo-Candian democratic system -
the Sacrosanct principle of freedom of speech. The second is that
the court, in dealing with an interlocutory matter, does not like to
usurp, in advance, the function of the ultimate tribunal in deciding
the case. 
22
Compare the approach at common law with the approach of the
Scottish courts on an application for interim interdict. In
considering the policy behind the law, a recent case quoted Lindley,
L.J. in another case:
I do not doubt that it is right when the evidence and facts warrant
it to exercise that jurisdiction, even upon an interlocutory
application, because prevention is better than cure, and an
injunction to stop the publication of libel is a great deal better
than an action of damages in consequence of its publication.23
The test to warrant such an interference was then stated to be:
But I think the matter must be judged from the point of view of
whether there is a prima facie case alleged, and, if there is, then
the question can be resolved by the test of the balance of
convenience.
24
Clearly, it is much easier to meet the test here than it is to meet the
common law test. It was pointed out, however, that under the law of
Scotland, no evidence was given in an application for interim
inderdict, as the court relied on averments and statements at the bar.
Hence, it would be difficult to say whether a particular applicant
would be bound to succeed upon the case - the common law test.
It must be noted that the common law rules developed at a time
when the majority of matters coming to the court were in printed
form. The Bonnard25 case dealt with matters published in a
financial newspaper and the other leading case dealt with
publication in form of trade circulars. 26 Clearly these types of
materials would not achieve the distribution of modem shows
broadcast on radio and T.V. Nor could the printed word convey the
meaning, as well, of the spoken word with its tone and inflection, or
of the visual image. It would be much easier for the court to
22. Gt. Brit. Report of the Committee on Defamation (London: Her Majesty's
Stationery Office, 1975)
23. Boyd v. British Broadcasting Corporation, [1969] S.L.T. 17 (Sh. Ct.)
24. Id. at 18
25. Bonnard v. Perryman, supra, note 19
26. William Coulson and Sons v. James Coulson and Co. (1876), 3 T.L.R. 846
(C.A.)
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examine the printed word to say the action was bound to succeed.
Yet, the Canada Metal27 case applied the age old authority without
any consideration of change in the technology of the publication. I
think this is clearly too strict an application of the rule to modern
circumstances.
While freedom of speech is beyond reproach, should not this be
balanced by a freedom of the individual to have his reputations
protected in appropriate cases? As the court said in the Boyd2 8 case,
the granting of the injunction would result in a temporary
inconvenience for the defendant - a mere delay in broadcasting the
film - while failure to grant it could result in great damage to the
plaintiff. Surely there is no better place to apply the maxim "an
ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure". The British
Committee on Defamation refused to recommend any change in the
common law in this regard, as no one had made any adverse
comments on the matter. 29 With all due respect, I feel that the
Scottish approach is much more just and can protect both freedom
of speech and the rights of the individual. This would be especially
appropriate to the broadcasting media due to their unique
characteristics and the potential for harm. Indeed, the defendant is
protected to some extent in both the common law and under the
Scottish law. If an interlocutory injunction, or interim interdict, has
issued, and the plaintiff is not successful on the subsequent
disposition of the case, he will be responsible for-any damages
resulting from the issuing of the injunction.
30
3. Innocent Dissemination -Due Diligence
Television and radio shows are often broadcast live. As a result,
such a publisher has little or no opportunity to carefully review
material not included in script form. People may make ad-lib
remarks and a person may flash a defamatory sign as a camera
sweeps a crowd of people. The law in this regard is well
summarized by the British Committee on Defamation:
298. At present a broadcasting company is liable for all material
broadcast or televised on its network, whether scripted or live,
whether it is a studio or an outside broadcast. Consequently, they
27. Canada Metal Co. Ltd. et al. v. Canada Broadcasting Corporation et al.,
supra, note 20
28. Boyd v. British Broadcasting Corporation, supra, note 23
29. Gt. Brit. Report of the Committee on Defamation, supra, note 22
30. Id at 87 and 88
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may incur liability for completely unexpected and unforeseeable
defamatory statements such as for example, a derogatory remark
made by a contributor in a live studio discussion, or banner or
leaflet thrust before the television camera in a live transmission of
a political meeting or demonstration.
3 1
This application stems from the strict approach to defamation
taken by courts in the past. It is the making of the statement which is
wrong, not, in fact, how it is made:
He has none the less imputed something disgraceful and has none
the less injured the plaintiff. A man in good faith may publish a
libel believing it to be true, and it may be found by the jury that
he acted in good faith believing it to be true, and reasonably
believing it to be true, but that in fact the statement is false.
Under these circumstances he has no defense to the action,
however excellent his intention.
32
This idea stems back into history, as it is said "... the same
answer suffices, that the action is not maintainable upon the ground
of the malignity, but for the damage sustained." 3 3 Hence, it appears
that the law of defamation approaches a strict liability test.
Relief was provided in two very narrow areas of the law. The first
is the defense of innocent dissemination, outlined by Romer, L.J. as
follows:
The result of the cases is I think that, as regards the person who is
not the printer or the first or main publisher of a work which
contains a libel, but has only taken, what I may call, a
subordinate part in disseminating it, in considering whether there
has been publication of it by him, the particular circumstances
under which he disseminated the work must be considered. If he
did it in the ordinary way of his business, the nature of the
business and the way in which it was conducted must be looked
at; and, if he succeeds in showing (1) that he was innocent of any
knowledge of the libel contained in the work disseminated by
him, (2) that there was nothing in the work or the circumstances
under which it came to him or was disseminated by him which
ought to have lead him to suppose that it contained a libel, and (3)
that, when the work was disseminated by him, it was not by any
negligence on his part that he did not know that it contained a
libel, then, although the dissemination of the work by him was
prima facie publication of it, he may nevertheless, on proof of the
before - mentioned facts, be held not to have published it. But
onus of proving such facts lies on him . .. 4
31. Id. at 82
32. E. Hulton & Co. v. Jones, [1910] A.C. 20 at 23-24 (H.L.)
33. Thorley v. Lord Kerry (1812), 4 Taunt. 355; 128 E.R. 367 (Comm.Pl.)
34. Vizetelly v. Mudie's Select Library, Limited, [ 1900] 2 Q.B. 170 (C. A.)
668 The Dalhousie Law Journal
This idea was originally developed to cover messengers and
carriers. While this was adopted in Canada, it must be pointed out
that this defense is very narrow. It applies mostly to vendors of
newspapers and booksellers, 3 5 and I have found no case where it
has applied to a television or radio broadcast. If an individual station
attempted to use the defense it would be confronted with two
arguments - that they were a first or even main publisher of the
work, and that their affiliation with network would remove the
availability of the defense, a circumstance attributing knowledge of
contents to the station.
Another narrow defense is that of accidental publication. This
applies in such cases where a letter addressed to one person is
opened and read by another.3 6 However, this has really no
application to the field of broadcasting, as there the intent to publish
generally to an audience is always present.
The application of the strict rule can have particularly hard
consequences in the field of broadcasting. As outlined in the two
examples at the beginning of this section, the T.V. editor will often
have no opportunity to prevent the publication of defamatory
material. The first area of broadcasting to encounter the problem
was the ever popular open line radio programmes. The problem was
met somewhat through the technology that was used. Conversations
were taped and replayed seconds later as a control device. Yet, this,
by itself, only allows for the very quickest of editing and does not
subject itself to the meticulous editing available in relation to the
printed word, nor are such methods adaptable to all fields of
broadcasting. Surely the public interest in such shows is not
disputed, and yet the strict rules will apply. This may be acceptable
if you see the station as being better able to bear the risk, and
perhaps to insure against it, but shouldn't some aspect of fairness
and justice apply? One would expect that the station could recover
on open line programmes from the caller making the defamatory
remarks. But perhaps it would be better to set some guidelines in
legislation.
It is useful on this aspect to examine the developments in
jurisdictions south of our border. The basic rule in the United
States, which is still law in some states, is similar to the
Anglo-Canadian rule. The real question was not at whom the article
35. Newton v. City of Vancouver et al. (1932), 46 B.C.R. 67 (B.C.S.C.). See
also, supra, note 22 at 81
36. Huth v. Huth, [1915] 3 K.B. 32 (C.A.)
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was aimed, or with what intent, but was who did it injure. 3 7 The
strict rule even applied in situations where the station was obliged to
give a person running for election equal time to that of his opponent.
In Sorenson v. Wood et. al.,3 8 in an action brought against the
station for words spoken during such time by a candidate against the
other candidate, the station claimed as a defense that the legislation
prohibited censorship of any kind and that therefore, they should not
be liable. The Court rejected this argument, claiming that only
political and partisan censorship was prohibited and that there was
no intent by Congress to give freedom to defame. The court rejected
the due care attitude adopted in the courts below.
However, a new trend developed in the case of Summit Hotel Co.
v. National Broadcasting Co. 3 9 The speaker in this case was an
employee of a third party to whom the broadcasting company had
leased its facilities, using due care in the leasing. The broadcaster
could not prevent the transmission, as the remarks were a quick
ad-lib interjection by a comedian. The court stated that:
• . .the doctrine of liability without fault has little or no place in
torts involving injuries to the person, and its extension from the
law of trespass to land has rarely been looked upon favorably in
this state.
40
The court went on to say strict liability should only be extended
where there is no other solution as a matter of public policy. The
law in Pennsylvania was said to be one of a strict standard of care
rather than one of absolute liability. The court went on to say that
while there is ample opportunity to proof read and examine printed
material to go into newspapers, and to do the same with scripts of
T.V. shows, the matter at bar was completely different. One of the
main problems in the case law was the adaptation of old law to new
areas. The court developed a new rule which would not be too
burdensome to the industry and yet protect the public in the
following terms:
We therefore conclude that a broadcasting company that leases its
time and facilities to another, whose agents carry on the program,
is not liable for an interjected defamatory remark where it appears
that it exercised due care in the selection of the lessee, and,
37. Rimmer v. Chadron Printing Co. (1953), 56 N.W. 2d 806 (Neb. Sup. Ct.);
Greer v. Skyway Broadcasting Company (1962), 124 S.E. (2d) 98 (N.C. Sup. Ct.)
38. (1932), 243 N.W. 82 (Neb. Sup. Ct.)
39. (1939), 8 A.2d 302 (Penn.Sup.Ct.); See also Kelly v. Hoffman et al. (1948),
61 A. 2d 143 (N.J.Ct.Err. & App.)
40. Summit Hotel, id. at 306
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having inspected and edited the script, had no reason to believe
that an extemporaneous defamatory remark would be made.
Where the broadcasting station's employee or agent makes the
defamatory remark, it is liable, unless the remarks are privileged
and there is no malice.
4 1
It has been claimed that the station should have corrected the remark
during the rest of the show. This idea was rejected, as they were not
liable for the remark, so why should they apologize. As well, such
action would only emphasize the remark and make the situation
worse.
The approach was adopted by the courts in several other states,
although some seemed to confuse the strict rule with the new
approach. 42 Paul Ashley, in his book, 43 states that over forty state
legislatures adopted a rule similar to the above judgement, making
stations liable only if they failed to exercise due care to prevent the
publication. 44 This was a question of fact for the jury. Some States,
he says, went as far as protecting a station broadcasting a network
programme if it was not the station of origin. The provisions for due
care, however, will not apply where the defendant station itself
published false and untrue material.
4 5
While the approach outlined in the Summit Hotel case, 46 is
extremely limited, it must be noted that it is a judicial recognition of
the unique nature of the broadcasting industry. As such, it would be
open to Canadian Courts to follow and develop. However, in view
of the statement made by the Committee on Defamation with which
this section began, it is unlikely that the courts will make such a
development on their own. If they did, however, they need not
restrict themselves to the narrow limits outlined in Summit Hotel.
41. Id. at 312
42. Gearhart v. W.S.A.Z., Inc., supra, footnote 5
43. Supra, note 1
44. See for example Mich. Comp. Laws. 1948, 484.331:
Sec. 1. The owner, licensee or operator of a visual or sound radio broadcasting
station or network of stations, and the agents or employees of any such owner,
licensee or operator, shall not be liable for any damages for any defamatory
statement published or uttered in or as a part of a visual or sound radio broadcast,
by one other than such owner, licensee or operator, or agent or employee thereof,
unless it shall be alleged and proved by the complaining party that such owner,
licensee, operator or such agent or employee has failed to exercise due care to
prevent the publication or utterance of such statement in such broadcast. P.A.
1951, No. 221, 1, Eff. Sept. 28
45. Gendusa v. Mid-Continent Telecasting, Inc. (1964), 397 F.2d. (Kan. Sup.
Ct.)
46. Supra, note 39
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The policy outlined above by the decision could well lead to an
expansion of the idea to allow a due diligence test in areas where a
sign is held up in a crowd and for ad-lib remarks by a person on a
show being broadcast live by the broadcaster itself.
If the development here depends on legislative change, the
prospects are not good. The British Committee refused to
recommend any change in the law in the area and cited four reasons
therefore. 4 7 1) Such matters may be considered in mitigation of
damages; 2) Difficulty of plaintiff to recover otherwise 3) Wide
circulation of the media should result in a strict test, and, 4) No
evidence of a large number of claims in this area. These reasons all
appear to be valid policy considerations. However the heavy
disadvantage to the industry in some areas, such as the sign in the
crowd situation, might appear very unjust, so perhaps some minor
form of due diligence test might be implemented. And, as pointed
out above, the courts alone have the capacity to do so, if they will
consider the policy behind the law and the special aspects of the
media.
4. News Services
One area which has special significance here is the receipt of news
items by T.V. stations from news services. The importance of
receiving accurate facts from such services would be very important
to T.V. stations. This is one of the few areas in Canada which has
seen litigation in the field of defamation in broadcasting. In a very
encouraging judgement, recognizing the situation and the aspects of
the medium, the Ontario High Court of Justice said:
The public mischief which could arise therefrom cannot be
measured. For, in this electronic age, it has become the evening
pastime of millions of Canadians to view the 11:00 o'clock news
before retiring. Such broadcasts are seen and heard even by the
illiterate. Most viewers come to rely on the correctness of the
facts as broadcast. Thus, there must be a safeguard to ensure that
the television media which simultanously reaches out to people in
all regions throughout Canada, broadcasts accurate facts.
48
Here, the T.V. Company was successfully sued for libel in relation
to a news item it carried. It sought recovery of part of the damages
against the third party, the supplier of the news item. The court held
47. Supra, note 22 at 82
48. Allan v. Bushwell T.V. Co. Ltd., Broadcast News Ltd., Third Party, [1969] 1
O.R. 107 (H.C.J.)
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that under the contract between the supplier and the station, there
was an implied condition that the news would be reasonably fit for
transmission - i.e. accurate - if 1) the station relies on the skill
and judgement of the news service and 2) the news service knows it
will be broadcast verbatim or in an edited form. If the material
supplied is defamatory, there is a breach of a condition of the
contract, and it being a fundamental one, no exemption clause
applies. The T.V. company, cannot however, recover for any part
of the damage for that portion of the award which was aggravated
by its editing. This is an important development for broadcasters.
5. Fair Comment
There is a defence to a defamation action called the defence of fair
comment. Gatley outlines the defence as follows:
To succeed in a defence of fair comment, words complained of
must be shown to be:
1) Comment
2) Fair comment
3) Fair Comment on some matter of public interest.
49
The reason why this topic is discussed in this paper is the interest
raised by the Lougheed case. 50 The ability of a visual portrayal to
convey other meanings, for words to convey something by a
different tone, for the media to broadcast fiction in the form of a
documentary and even to make-up someone to portray a person in
such a way as to physically resemble a real person, all have an affect
on fair comment. The Alberta Supreme Court, in dealing with an
interlocutory application on a different matter, put it well when it
said:
The vehicle which published the alleged defamation in this case
is a play broadcast over a television network. A television play
typically presents a story to the viewing audience by a
combination of spoken words, the manner and craft of the actors
portraying the various characters in the play, the sets and
costumes and, even in some cases, by the use of special effects
such as background music. In this medium it is quite possible that
the words themselves spoken by the actors do not convey a
defamatory meaning but the manner in which the words are
spoken or the gestures of the actor speaking them may convey an
entirely different impression to the viewing public. 51
49. Gatley on Libel and Slander, supra, note 4 at 293-294
50. Supra, note 14
5 I. Id. at 297
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The danger here, in relation to the defense, is the confusion of fact
and comment, and the portrayal of comment as fact.
The common law appears to provide protection in this regard:
But the distinction cannot be too clearly borne in mind between
comment or criticism and allegations of fact, such as that
disgraceful acts have been committed, or discreditable language
used. It is one thing to comment upon or criticize, even with
severity, the acknowledged or proved acts of a public man, and
quite another to assert that he has been guilty of particular acts of
misconduct.52
The distinction is clearly drawn by Lord Justice Fletcher Moulton
' . . "Comment in order to be justifiable must appear as comment
and must not be so mixed up with the facts that the reader cannot
distinguish what is report and what is comment." 53 "Any matter,
therefore, which does not indicate with reasonable clearness that it
purports to be a comment, and not statement of fact, cannot be
protected by the plea of fair comment.' ' 54 The Lord Justice
suggested that the reason for the approach was that injustice is
prevented if the reader can clearly see the facts from which the
person commenting draws his inference. If the facts are stated
clearly, the reader can draw his own inference. By confusing fact
and comment, the reader would assume that the presentation had
been based on reasonable grounds. The learned judge in Mitchell v.
Times Publishing Co. 55 suggested that the defense would thus not
apply where a reasonable man could not distinguish between fact
and comment.
The above seems quite clear and should apply a fortiori to a
situation in which visual images are presented. The above
authorities all relate to written material where the reader has the
words before him and can re-examine them carefully at his will to
distinguish between what is fact and what is comment. The same
opportunity is not present when the material is but a fleeting glimpse
of visual material upon a television screen. However, the distinction
above has often been blurred.
In Sheppard v. Bulletin, 56 the court seems to suggest that all that
52. Davis & Sons v. Shepstone (1886), 11 App. Cas. 187
53. Hunt v. The Star Newspaper Company, Ltd., [1908] 2 K.B. 304 at 319 (C.A.)
54. Id. at 320
55. [1944] 1 W.W.R. 400 (B.C.S.C.); (Sub. nom. Mitchell v. Victoria Daily
News, [1944] 2 D.L.R. 239 (B.C.S.C.)
56. (1916), 27 D.L.R. 526 (Alta. S.C.). This case was reversed on other grounds
in (1917), 55 S.C.R. 454
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is required for a statement to qualify as comment is that it be
accompanied by other facts, that it refer back to those facts, and that
the comment be reasonably based on those facts. At first glance, the
decision of the Alberta court seems contrary to the authority above.
However, upon close examination, the learned judge appears to
have confused the proper test to be applied. He uses language akin
to that used in deciding whether a certain comment exceeds the
bounds of fair comment and not whether it was comment portrayed
as fact in the first instance. This is a very common error in this field.
The difference can be seen in the latitude given by the courts in
finding that once something is comment, that it is within the bounds
of fair comment. All that is required here is that the comment relate
to true fact and be an honest opinion. 57 This relates back to the very
broad test here, enunciated by Lord Esher:
What is the meaning of 'fair comment'? I think the meaning is
this: is the article in the opinion of the jury that which any fair
man, however prejudiced or however strong his opinion may be,
would say of the work in question? Every latitude must be given
to opinion and to prejudice. 58
However, that is a very different test relating to a different question.
Once this confusion has been eliminated, there is authority to
allow relief in the area of fair comment in broadcasting due to the
obvious susceptibility of confusion of fact and comment on the
medium. The case came up for decision in Barltrop v. Canadian
Broadcasting Corporation, 59 and the court took the authority that
was available for it. In this view, a physician had received $1,000 a
day plus expenses while appearing for a manufacturer on hearings
into alleged lead pollution by the companies. In a C.B.C. radio
programme, that physician was said to be an example of an expert
hired to give an opinion favourable to the interests paying him.
They implied that the physician was dishonest and he sued. The
Court reaffirmed the old authority:
To be comment, fair or unfair, a statement must be a statement of
opinion and not a statement of fact. It must be an expression of
opinion about facts which must have been presented to the
readers or listeners, or be well known to them, and which
themselves be substantially true. Such comment, with such a
base, may then be excused even though it is defamatory, if it was
57. Slim and Others v. Daily Telegraph Ltd. and Others, [1968] 2 Q.B.D. 157
(C.A.)
58. Merivale v. Carson (1887), 20 Q.B.D. 215 at 280 (C.A.)
59. (1978), 25 N.S.R. (2d) 637 (N.S.S.C. App.Div.)
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a fair and honest expression of opinion on a matter of public
interest.
60
In this case, the defense failed because:
.. . the words found defamatory in meaning and by innuendo
are, in my opinion, not comment but false statements of fact....
The remaining remarks state or imply as a fact that Dr. Barltrop
for a price has given false or misleading evidence with unethical
disregard for the health of the public. They assert as a fact that he
was professionally dishonest. They are therefore not mere
expressions of opinion, such as might have been the case had the
accusers set faith substantially true facts from which dishonesty
might fairly be inferred and had then expressed their opinion that
they thought he was dishonest.
61
While this case did not deal with the special aspects of the medium
which lend themselves to achieving greater confusion of fact and
comment, the clear distinction between the two issues involved i.e.
fact v. comment and comment v. bounds of fair comment, augers
well for a future case which will deal with the issue.
Before leaving this area, it is worth noting one aspect of the law
in which the United States has acted but Canada has not. In the
U.S., if a person is attacked and the matter is a controversy of
public importance, that person must be notified by the broadcaster
(licensee), and a tape or transcript of the remarks must be provided.
As well, he must be given a reasonable opportunity to respond. This
doctrine of fairness is included in Federal Government Regulations.
In Canada, there is no such requirement, and a station need not even
supply its tapes upon request - although many do. This is one area
where legislative reform is perhaps needed.
62
6. Parliamentary Privilege
The privilege attached to words spoken in Parliament applies to the
broadcasting industry in two respects. The first, of course, is the
broadcasting of news reports about proceedings in the House. A
very good recent case on the issue was Cook v. Alexander and
Others. 63 Under this authority, a summary or prdcis of Parliamen-
tary proceedings are privileged if it is a fair and honest report of
60. Id. at 657
61. Id. at 659-660
62. For a discussion on the area generally, see Levy, "Open Line Radio Programs
and the Law" (1969), 1 Can. Comm. L.R. 160
63. [1973] 3 W.L.R. 617 (C.A.); see also Wason v. Walter (1868), L.R. 4 Q.B.
73
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what took place, on the policy ground that people should know what
goes on in Parliament. There is a qualified privilege in the reporter,
as long as he is not activated by malice. In addition, the reporter can
then proceed to make fair comment on the matters. This also applies
to a sketch of the proceedings in newspapers - this being a
selection of interesting parts of the proceedings of special public
interest and description thereon. It is privileged as long as it is fairly
and honestly made with the intention of giving an impression of the
impact made on the hearers. There is no reason for any different
application of these principles to news reports on the broadcast
media.
The second area of interest is in relation to live broadcasts of
Parliamentary proceedings. Words spoken by a member of
Parliament within Parliament are absolutely privileged and once it is
determined that the words are spoken in Parliament, the court loses
all jurisdiction. 64 This authority goes as far back as the Bill of
Rights. 6 5 However this does not apply to matters repeated outside
the House and hence did not cover letters posted to a member by the
defendant seeking redress.6 6 Nor did it cover a situation where a
member submitted a more correct version of his speech to a
newspaper. 67 The fact that the proceeding in the House was deemed
not to be libelous did not warrant later distribution through
newspapers. If correction was needed, this could be achieved within
Parliament and there was no need to resort to the newspapers.
Hence, in order to be privileged absolutely, the statement must
be made within Parliament and must not be repeated outside on
another occasion. The now live broadcasts from the House have
destroyed the initial concept of Parliamentary privilege as the words
are now simultaneously broadcast to the living rooms and bedrooms
of the nation. However, since the member is speaking within the
walls of Parliament and due to the fact that public policy requires
total freedom within the House in order to carry on Government, the
member would appear to be protected against any action for words
spoken on the air from the House on grounds of absolute privilege
- there is no cause of action, even in the face of express malice. A
case has yet to decide this matter.
64. Dillon v. Balfour (1887), 20 L.R. Ir. 600 (Ex. Div.); see Vezina v. Lacroix
(1936), 40 Que. P.R. 1 (Sup. Ct.)
65. 1 W. & M. Sess.2, c. 2
66. Rivlin v. Bilainkin, [1953] 1 Q.B. 485 (Super. Ct.)
67. The King v. Creevey (1813), 1 M. & S. 273; 105 E.R. 102 (K.B.)
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But, what of the broadcaster? Is he to be protected on the ground
of only qualified privilege or is absolute privilege to apply? With
absolute privileges there is no cause of action. In qualified
privilege, he is protected only if the broadcast is honestly made and
there has been no malice - i.e. - not using the occasion honestly
for the purpose for which the law gives protection. This is still open
for a court to decide and it will have to decide on the policy matters
involved. Perhaps the rather rare possibility of having express
malice in such a situation may result in having to wait a long time
for a decision on the matter.
The British Committee has considered this problem. 68 They
recommended that live sound coverage of Parliamentary proceed-
ings be given absolute privilege and that live picture coverage be
given only qualified privilege. The reason for the difference was
that in the latter, the editors have the capacity to choose which
visual image of several to show - and this could make a difference
in the effect conveyed by the words. Malice could enter into such a
selection and hence the lesser privilege. We have reached the stage
in Canada where we have live coverage of Parliament and yet no
thought has been given to this matter in the field of defamation. This
is one area where the special nature of the medium deserves special
attention. Once again, we will have to wait for the courts to deal
with the matter - unless the legislatures decide to act first.
IV. The Legislation
There are two legislative enactments which have some bearing on
the topic of this paper, one Federal and the other Provincial. To deal
first with the Federal legislation, the Broadcasting Act 69 states:
3. It is hereby declared that (c) all persons licensed to carry on
broadcasting undertakings have a responsibility for programs
they broadcast but the right to freedom of expression and the right
of persons to receive programs, subject only to generally
applicable statutes and regulations is unquestioned:
Thus, besides making the licensees liable for the programmes
broadcast, the Federal law leaves the area of defamation in
broadcasting open to the generally applicable law, and makes no
special rules. The only other reference within the Federal Act which
remotely approaches the topic is as follows: in s. 3(d):
68. Gt. Brit. Report of the Committee on Defamation, supra, note 22 at 56
69. Broadcasting Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. B- II
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The programming provided by the Canadian broadcasting system
should be varied and comprehensive and should provide
reasonable, balanced opportunity for the expression of differing
views on matters of public concern, and the programming
provided by each broadcaster should be of high standard, using
predominantly Canadian creative and other sources.
70
The C.R.T.C. can allocate time for the purposes under s. 16 (1) (i).
This is the closest that Canadian law comes to the fairness doctrine
present in the United States, as outlined above. However there are
no set requirements to allow a reply by a defamed person and the
general provisions above will be of very little assistance to him.
The bulk of applicable legislation in the field is covered by the
Defamation Act. 7 1 By s.2 of the Act, broadcasting of words
(including visual images) is treated as publication in permanent
form and is therefore libel. One significant aspect of the Act is
contained in s.4 - which allows the defendant to give evidence, in
mitigation of damages, proof that he published an apology for the
defamation before the action commenced, or as soon after
commencement as he had an opportunity where the action has
commenced quickly. The law of what constitutes an apology is well
set out as follows:
The defendant should admit the charge was unfounded, that it
was made without proper information, under an entire misap-
prehension of the real facts, etc., and that he regrets that it was
published in his paper. Merely to say that you are sorry may
mean that you are sorry because you have laid yourself open to an
action, not that you repent having inflicted an unmerited wrong.
... The most proper apology cannot undo the irretrievable
publication and dissemination of the slander, nor be regarded as
complete restitution, though it may properly be considered in
damages.
72
The same law applies to libel on the broadcasting medium and
demonstrates that the apology must be fairly complete and definite.
As well, an apology under the Act is personal to the person making
it, and a radio show host may not be covered by the apology of the
station. 73 This ability to apologize can be a powerful defense to a
70. Id.
71. Defamation Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 72. Most other provinces have very
similar legislation.
72. Thompson v. N.L. Broadcasting Ltd. and Pilz (Harrison) (1976), 1 C.C.L.T.
278 (B.C.S.C.), citing Haste v. Victorian Times Publishing Company (1889), 1
B.C.R. 365 (S.C.)
73. Fritz et al. Realescope Realty Ltd. and Pacific Rim Equities Corp. v. Jim
Pattison Broadcasting Ltd., Murphy and McKilka, [1976] W.W.D. 180 (B.C.S.C)
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broadcasting company and lessens the need for a due diligence
requirement under Canadian law.
S.9 of the Act goes on to broaden the defense of fair comment to
a slight extent, saying that as long as the comment is fair the defense
will not fail merely because truth of every allegation of fact cannot
be shown. This should not affect, however, the situation where fact
and comment are so mixed as to be indistinguishable, and the other
rules, discussed above, apply.
S. 12 (1) (a) maintains a qualified privilege for fair and accurate
reports of Parliamentary proceedings. Without further legislative
change, this would probably apply to give only qualified privilege
to live sound broadcasts. However, in a rare display of advancement
in the field, s.12 (6) (b) says the 12 (1) (a) does not apply if the
plaintiff shows that the defendant was requested to broadcast a
reasonable statement of explanation or contradiction by the plaintiff
and refused. Such statement would have to be broadcast on at least
two occasions on different days at the same time as the alleged
defamatory matter was broadcast. Hence, in areas of qualified
privilege of public proceedings, there is an aspect of the "fairness"
doctrine present in Nova Scotia.
Section 15 (1) allows an offer of amends to be a defense where
there has been an "innocent" publication of the matter. This is
narrowly defined under s. 15 (5) to cover only situations where
there was no intent to publish the words as applying to that person,
the words were not defamatory on their face and the publisher did
not know of the circumstances which made them defamatory of the
plaintiff and had exercised all reasonable care in relation to the
publication. This is hardly a radical relaxation of the absolute
liability for defamatory statements.
Perhaps one of the best benefits of the Act are the strict time
limits imposed for action. The plaintiff must give broadcaster
fourteen days written notice of intent to bring an action within three
months after the publication of the matter has come to his attention
(under s.17 (1)), and the action must be commenced within six
months after the publication has come to his attention (s. 18).
Certain other relief is provided under s.20, where retraction may be
pleaded in mitigation of damage, and s.21 where only special
damages are available in certain circumstances.
In general, therefore, while the Nova Scotia Act cannot claim to
deal totally with the problems raised in Part III, some relief is
provided in the apology and time limit aspects. However,
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improvement is still needed in areas such as injunctions, due care,
parliamentary privilege and other matters.
Before closing, it might be useful here, to show the deficiency of
the legislation, to examine the particular problem of cable
television. This type of technology is not covered by the definition
of broadcasting in s. I (a) of the Nova Scotia Act and hence any
defamatory publication is left totally to the common law. One
significant aspect here is that the shorter time limitations of the Act
would not apply. Such an omission is simply due to the advances of
technology occuring more rapidly than the legislators can consider
them. Due to the fact that cable television networks are expected to
give access to groups who do not have access to traditional outlets,
the danger of defamation may be even greater. And indeed, the need
for change in the law may be greater, as for instance in the due care
cases. One group recommended:
The Act should be amended to protect a cable television company
which provides its technical facilities to a community group, but
has not control over nonpersonnel involved in the content of the
program, always provided that an announcement to this effect is
made before each such program, or, in the case of continuous
transmissions, at regular intervals.
74
V. The Constitutional Problem
In the event that one decides the law as it presently stands does
require change, the problem to be faced is complicated by the
federal system present in Canada. Which level of government has
the legislative competence to enact the needed changes? In an
article dealing with cable television systems, the following
comment was made (hereinafter referred to as the cable T.V.
quote):
Although federal jurisdiction over broadcasting has been
termed "exclusive", it is generally thought that defamation
legislation at the provincial level is applicable to broadcasting
stations so long as such legislation is aimed at the news media
generally (e.g. both newspapers and broadcasting stations) as in
fact is the case. Defamation legislation as such is of course a
provincial responsibility under the head "civil rights in the
province". Although federal legislation relating to defamation by
broadcasting stations would take precedence, no such federal
statutes have been passed, and in fact the federal Broadcasting
74. Johns, Royce, Shaughnessy and Wiltshire, "Defamation on Cable Television
Systems: The Legal and Practical Problems" (1970), 2 Can. Comm. L.R. 15 at 20
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Act seems to have left specific room for provincial legislation on
the subject by the statement in section 3(c) that the "right of free
expression is unquestioned, subject only to generally applicable
statutes and regulations."
75
The statements made above seem rather clear, but legislative
competence may not be as clear as is indicated. What follows is a
review of the cases in the area and a comparison of possible
conclusions with those suggested in the quote.
The basis of federal competence in broadcasting was the decision
of the Privy Council in the famous Radio Reference. 76 The question
was whether the Federal Government had jurisdiction to regulate
radio communication by means of Hertzian waves, including both
television and radio signals. The Privy Council held that the matter
was exclusively within federal competence on several grounds. The
first was the power to implement Canadian treaties under the peace,
order and good government clause. This application of the treaty
power was later disapproved, and so need not concern us further.
The Court went on to say that there was exclusive jurisdiction under
the exception clause in s.92 (10) (a) of the BNA Act, 7 7 and as a
result, had the same effect as if the power were expressly set out in
s. 91. Under that exception, the transmissions were either included
in the word "telegraph" or were "undertakings connecting the
province with any other or others of the provinces, or extending
beyond the limits of the province." It refused to separate the
transmitter and receiver operations, viewing the system as a whole.
The Courts went even further in the CFRB. 7 8 case. The question
here was whether the Federal Government had jurisdiction to
prohibit the showing of television election campaign advertisements
in a Provincial election for a period of 48 hours prior to voting. It
had been argued that a distinction should be made between the
carrier system itself and the intellectual content of the programmes.
The court refused to make such a distinction and held that there was
an exclusive jurisdiction in Parliament over content as well - as it
covered "the whole of the undertaking of broadcasting. "79 They
rested their decision on still another ground, that being that
75. Id. at 16
76. Re Regulation and Control of Radio Communications, [1932] A.C. 304 (P.C.)
77. British North America Act, R.S.C. 1970, Appendix II
78. Re C.F.R.B. andAttorney-General of Canada, [1973] 3 O.R. 819 (Ont. C.A.)
79. See also: Re Public Utilities Commission and Victoria Cable-vision (1965), 51
D.L.R. (2d) 716 (B.C.C.A.); Public Service Board et al. v. Dionne et al., [197812
S.C.R. 191
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broadcasting fell within the peace, order, and good government
power, since it had attained such dimensions as to affect the body
politic of Canada. The mere affectation of provincial powers - i.e.
provincial elections - did not affect the classification. In a rather
sweeping statement, Kelly J.A. had this to say:
While the control of individual persons might be legally
accomplished by provincial legislation, the carrier system, being
solely under the control and regulation of the parliament, is
beyond the reach of provincial legislation. 80
He went on to say that there was no overlapping jurisdiction.
Federal regulation of content was also upheld in the Capital Cities
case at the Supreme Court of Canada level.81 If the matter stopped
here, it would appear that there is no provincial jurisdiction.
However, one vital Supreme Court decision has opened the door.
In the Attorney-General of the Province of Quebec v. Kellogg's
Company of Canada and Kellogg's of Canada Limited, 8 2 the Court
had occasion to consider Quebec's Consumer Protection Act which
prohibited the use of cartoon characters in advertising directed
toward children. The Government of Quebec sought an injunction
against the company and the latter challenged the validity of the
law. By a majority, the court rejected the company's submissions
and upheld the law. They characterized the issue as one of the
control of a commercial enterprise within the province and
protection of children against the harmful effects of advertising,
both areas being within provincial competence. The mere choice of
television as the media could not exempt the company from
responsibility. In an interesting comment, Martland, J. said:
A person who caused defamatory material to be published by
means of a televised program would not be exempt from liability
under provincial law because the means of publication were
subject to federal control. Further, he could be enjoined from
repeating the publication.
83
All may not be lost for provincial regulation of broadcasting a
80. Re C.F.R.B. and Attorney General of Canada, [1973] 3 O.R. 819 at 827
(C.A.)
81. Capital Cities Communication Inc., Taft Broadcasting Company and
W.B.E.N., Inc. v. Canadian Radio-Television Commission, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 141.
At p. 162, Laskin C.J.C., said: "Programme content regulation is inseparable from
regulating the undertaking through which programs are received and sent on as part
of the total enterprise."
82. [1978]2 S.C.R. 211
83. Id. at 225
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defamatory statement. In stark contrast on the whole issue were the
remarks of Laskin, C.J.C., in dissent:
. . . and the generality of the challenged provincial legislation
and regulation does not aid the Province in extending its
prohibition of advertising to a medium which is outside of its
legislative jurisdiction. 
84
To conclude, therefore, the exclusive federal field may not be so
exclusive.
What then is the position in relation to the law of defamation? In
the background is the extreme reluctance to split the legislative field
of broadcasting in any manner, including content. The cable T.V.
quote, however, suggests that if the provincial law has general
application, then legislative competence is established. At first
glance, this may seem well founded - as laws in relation to
defamation would generally fall to the province under s.92 (13) of
the B.N.A. Act. 85 As well, the fact that Laskin was in dissent above
would bolster the argument. However, upon what grounds may this
"generality" suggestion rest? There could be two such grounds.
The first is by an analogy to the similar application in the field of
company law. In this area, the courts have drawn a distinction
between the power to incorporate and the power to regulate, and
will allow provincial law of general application to affect federally
incorporated companies, as long as they do not impair or sterilize
the status or capacity of such companies. 8 6 However, this is a
special aspect of constitutional law and one should be wary of a
general application elsewhere. Perhaps Hogg best describes the
situation when he says:
While provincial law of special application to undertakings
within federal jurisdiction is not necessarily invalid, it is also true
that a provincial law of general application is not necessarily
valid in its application to undertakings within federal jurisdiction.
Normally, as we have seen, a provincial law of general
application which is in relation to a provincial matter may validly
affect federal matters as well. 
8 7
Thus, it is dangerous to apply generalization even within the field of
company law, without extending it beyond that field.
84. Id. at 215-216
85. R.S.C. 1970, Appendix II
86. Canadian Indemnity Co. v. Attorney-General of British Columbia, [1976] 5
W.W.R. 748 (S.C.C.)
87. Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (Toronto: The Carswell
Company Limited, 1977) at 83
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The second ground is perhaps better. It is the opinion of the writer
that this "generality" principle is merely nothing more than an
application of determining the pith and substance of an enactment
and then allowing an incidental effect upon matters not within the
competence of the enacting legislature. The comments by Martland
above 88 would be consistent with this idea in that 'defamation' law
would be the pith and substance of such law, with a mere incidental
effect on broadcasting. And in any event, if one feels that
defamatory statements on broadcasting medium deserve special
treatment, and that legislative change is needed, the general
application, in its literal sense, would not apply. Therefore, one
would have to rely on the pith and substance argument.
To elaborate, if broadcasting needs special treatment in the field,
the law would not be of the general application suggested in the
cable T.V. quote. It would be aimed specifically at broadcasting
and would come dangerously close to being within the so-called
"exclusion" field of Parliament. If the provinces are to be able to
legislate in the area, some other basis is needed. To deal with any
legislation in the field, the court would first characterize the law as
to its pith and substance, its prime aspect. If found to be dealing in
pith and substance with defamation, it would be provincial under
s.92 (13); if with broadcasting, it would be federal. However, there
is authority for saying that a particular subject matter may have two
aspects, giving both Parliament and the legislatures jurisdiction. 89
Such a law would deal heavily with particular aspects of defamation
and could easily be so categorized. If Parliament passed similar
laws, it could have equal overtones in relation to broadcasting. The
Kellogg90 case could help the provinces, but it must be noted that
the court there refused to deal with the question of what the result
would have been if the injunction had been directed to the television
station. That question has to be decided here as such a law as is
contemplated would apply directly against a broadcaster. It must be
noted as well that Capital Cities91 and C.F.R.B.92 in saying the
content was under federal regulation, were dealing with challenges
to federal laws. In the case contemplated here, the challenge would
be in relation to a provincial law, as was the case in Kellogg.
88. See quote, supra, note 83
89. Hodge v. The Queen (1883), 9 App. Cas. 117 (P.C.)
90. [1978] 2 S.C.R. 211
91. [1978]2 S.C.R. 141
92. [197313 O.R. 819 (C.A.)
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Hence, it is entirely conceivable that both "aspects" would be
valid. As such the laws may overlap where the field is clear. 93 But,
if there is an inconsistency, the federal law will prevail. This brings
to the fore the doctrine of paramountcy, best set out by Hogg as
follows:
• . . one must conclude that the cumulative effect of the recent
decisions seems to be that the sole test of inconsistency in
Canadian Constitutional law is express contradiction. There is no
room for any negative implication to be added to the express
stipulation of the federal law. This is the course of judicial
restraint, allowing the fullest possible play to provincial
legislation. 94
If this is the attitude taken, only where the federal law expressly
contradicts a provincial law would the latter prevail. The provincial
field would be open to enactment, especially due to the apparent
failure by the Federal Government to legislate in the area.
To conclude, federal jurisdiction over broadcasting is well
established, both as to the system and the content. There is no
dispute, however, over provincial competence in relation to
defamation. Due to the need for special rules in relation to
defamation on radio and T.V., the "generality" aspect, as
mentioned in the T.V. quote, on its literal meaning will not apply to
establish provincial competence. It is contended, however, that
such special laws could have a dual aspect, vesting authority in both
levels of government. Whether this approach is possible is
questionable, due to the reluctance of the Kellogg9 5 judgement to
deal with the situation of what would happen if the T.V. station
were directly involved, as would be the case here. If there is-a dual
aspect, the doctrine of paramountcy of federal legislation would
operate, as suggested in the cable T.V. quote, but the narrow
application of the doctrine leaves the field open.
Several problems still remain and deserve brief reference. If the
dual aspect approach were not accepted and only the federal
government could legislate on defamation matters in broadcasting,
provincial competence to legislate might still exist in certain areas.
While the cases seem to indicate extension of federal control to
systems broadcasting totally intraprovincially, some dispute still
93. Attorney-General for Canada v. Attorney-General for British Columbia,
[1930] A.C. 111 (P.C.)
94. Supra, note 87 at 104-110
95. [197812S.C.R. 211
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exists here. 96 As well, a situation may arise where a cable television
station does not receive any Hertzian waves, but broadcasts totally
from its own studios. This would not be covered by the existing case
law on cable T.V. regulation. Hence, such regulation might be
within provincial competence. However, the splitting of such
legislative authority is unlikely due to all comments in cases
upholding federal jurisdiction. To split the jurisdiction and the law
of defamation in the two areas could only lead to chaos and
confusion.
If the provinces do have authority, another problem arises.
Various provinces could adopt different standards and national
broadcasters could have a hard time taking advantage of a special
law, due to forum shopping by plaintiffs. In order to protect
themselves, as well, due to different standards, a national broadcast
would have to conform with the strictest provincial law.
VI. Jurisdiction and Conflict of Laws
State boundaries are no barrier to a broadcast. A court may hold
that the final act of the broadcast occurred in a receiving set a
thousand miles away, rather than in the studio. If a person
resident and known in that distant state is defamed or his right of
privacy is violated, the law of that state may govern, in the suit
against that station.
97
In Canada, a national broadcast will be seen in ten different
provinces, with ten different laws. If provinces bring in special
legislation for broadcast defamation, the problem becomes more
acute. Where would the suit occur and what law will apply?
The problem of where to sue arose in Jenner v. Sun Oil Company
Limited et. al. 98 This was an action to set aside an order to allow the
issuance of a writ outside of Ontario, and to allow service on
residents of the United States. Alleged defamatory words were
broadcast by the defendant radio station, located in the U.S. and
heard in Ontario, where the plaintiff resided. The court considered
whether it had jurisdiction to hear the case and in order to allow the
service outside the province, it was necessary for them to conclude
that the tort was committed in Ontario. This latter point is left for
discussion later in this part of the paper. In considering whether the
court had jurisdiction to hear the case, it was stated that many
96. See Hogg, supra, note 87
97. Ashley, supra, note 1 at 118
98. [1952] O.R. 240 (Ont. H.C.)
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factors must be considered to decide if it was the forum conveniens,
including those affecting the plaintiff and defendant, and the
convenience of both.
In an action for defamation it is a matter of great importance
whether the plaintiff is a resident of the locality in which the writ
is issued, whether he has a place of business there and whether he
seeks to clear his good name of the imputation made against him
in that locality (emphasis added) 99
And later in the judgement:
• . . if there is evidence in a particular case that a person had a
reputation in this country to be defamed, or was known here, or
traded here, or had professional or social connections, it might be
that the circulation of a very few copies might do him serious or
irreparable harm. It is certainly an element to be taken into
consideration. The mere fact by itself of very small circulation,
even in a foreign tongue, would not necessarily preclude him from
saying that among the people of that nation who read that paper in
this country, he would suffer grievously in reputation. 100
Thus some connection of the plaintiff to a province and a
defamatory statement published there would give courts of that
province jurisdiction to hear the case.
The matter of jurisdiction in matters of tort was recently heard in
the Supreme Court of Canada in Moran et. al. v. Pyle National
(Canada) Ltd. 101 In deciding whether the courts of Saskatchewan
had jurisdiction to hear a case of a man electrocuted in
Saskatchewan as a result of removing a light bulb manufactured in
Ontario, the Court said jurisdiction to hear the case depended upon
whether or not the tort was committed within the province.
Arbitrary rules such as the place of conduct, or place of injury were
not to be used in determining the place of the tort. Instead, the real
test was that of a substantial connection to the province. Hence, the
province substantially affected by the defendant's activities or its
consequences would have jurisdiction to hear the case.
.. . where a foreign defendant carelessly manufactures a product
in a foreign jurisdiction which enters into the normal channels of
trade and he knows or ought to know both that as a result of his
carelessness a consumer may well be injured and it is reasonably
99. Id. at 252
100. Id. at 253, citing Slesser, L.J. In Kroch v. Rassell et Compagnie Sociitj des
Personnes h Responsibiliti Limitie, [ 1937] 1 All E.R. 725 (C.A.)
101. [1975]1 S.C.R. 393
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foreseeable that the product would be used as consumed where
the plaintiffs used or consumed it, then the forum in which the
plaintiff suffered damage is entitled to exercise jurisdiction over
that foreign defendant. 
102
The above statement could be easily adapted to cover defamatory
statements entering broadcast channels to injure someone resident in
another jurisdiction, allowing that latter jurisdiction to hear the
case.
Indeed, this fits in well with the earlier decision in Jenner. 103
There would have been indeed a substantial connection with Ontario
to allow jurisdiction in that case. Compare the comments of
McRuer, C.J.H.C., with the quote above:
Radio broadcasts are made for the purpose of being heard. The
programme here in question was put on the air for advertising
purposes. It is to be presumed that those who broadcast over a
radio network in the English language intend that the messages
they broadcast will be heard by large numbers of those who
receive radio messages in the English language. '
0 4
The court went on to say that in defamation, it was the publication
that gave rise to the action and that therefore the publication in
Ontario was a tort committed in Ontario,' 0 5 and therefore there was
jurisdiction to allow service outside the province. 
10 6
However, mere jurisdiction to hear the case does not solve the
problems that arise. The proper law to be applied by that court
remains to be determined.
A province might have the right to take jurisdiction and yet not
have the power to change the rules used to identify the legal
system under which the rights and liabilities of the parties fall to
be determined. 1 0 7
No matter what court has jurisdiction, the choice of law should be
the same. In the situation where the broadcast originates and is
102. Id. at 409
103. [1952] 2 O.R. 240 (H.C.)
104. Id. at 249
105. See also: Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting Co. et al. (1934), 8 F. Supp. 889
(Dist. Ct.Mo.)
106. Where to sue within the province is dealt with in s. 19 of the Defamation Act,
R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 72. This is generally the county where the office of the
broadcaster is located or where the plaintiff resides. However, upon application of
either party, and where the interests of justice require, the court can order a trial to
be held in another county.
107. Hertz, "Interprovincial', the Constitution, and the Conflict of Laws" (1976),
26 U. Toronto L.J. 84
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received in the same province, there is no problem and the law of
that province applies for suits in that province. However, there are
two situations in which merely having jurisdiction to try the case
does not necessarily also mean that the lexfori will apply. The first
is a situation where the broadcast was made and published only in
another province, and the plaintiff resident in this province takes
action here and the local court decides it has jurisdiction. The
second is a situation where the broadcast originates in another
province, but is published here (and perhaps in other provinces as
well). The problems become particularly important if special
legislation in relation to defamatory broadcasts have been passed in
several provinces, including the province where suit is brought, but
where no such law exists where broadcast originated or was made.
The first situation was dealt with by the Supreme Court of Canada
in McLean v. Pettigrew, 108 a case in which a car accident occurred
in Ontario but all the people involved were from Quebec and the
action was commenced there. The Court permitted the action to be
tried in Quebec because 1) it was actionable under the law of the
forum (i.e. - there was a cause of action in Quebec if it had
occurred there) and 2) it was non-justifiable according to the law of
the place where the accident occurred, and therefore punishable
there. 10 9 This adapted the traditional English approach, and in
accepting the case of Machado v. Fontes,110 the Supreme Court
seems to say that once those tests are met, the law of the forum will
apply. Thus, in this situation if the lexfori has special legislation, it
would seem to apply.
However, the Machado case has been overruled in England."'
The decision in that case, however, is not clear as to what the new
test would be. Lord Hodson and Lord Wilberforce overruled the case
and would apply the law of the place under the proper law of tort
approach as in Moran. 112 Lords Pearson and Donovan applied the
108. [1945]S.C.R. 62
109. Some cases have satisfied the second requirement by finding criminal
punishment would lie, even though on a civil action, there would be justification
under the law of the place of the accident. Brown v. Poland and Emerson Motors
Ltd. (1952), 6 W.W.R. (N.S.(368) Alta. S.C.); Anderson v. Eric Anderson Radio
and T.V. Pty. Ltd. (1964), 65 S.R. (N.S.W.) 279 (S.C. In Banco)
110. [1897] 2 Q.B. 231 (C.A.). Here, there was an action for libel in Brazil in an
English court. In Brazil, the only action would have been criminal proceedings, but
the court applied English law and allowed civil recovery.
111. Chaplin v. Boys, [1971] A.C. 356 (H.L.)
112. [1975] 1 S.C.R. 393
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old law, while Lord Guest overruled Machado and decided the case
on a very narrow ground. However, both Lords Guest and Donovan
stated that the proper law of tort approach had no place in a unitary
state, as was the case in Britain. However, Canada is not such a
unitary state, so it is possible the law may change in this area. There
have been some isolated judgements in support of this new approach
in Canada. 1 1 3 But until accepted, or rejected by the Supreme Court,
the approach taken may be uncertain. If the new approach is
accepted, the substantial connection test may apply here to
determine not only jurisdiction but also the proper law to apply to
the case.
The position under the second situation outlined above is far from
clear in Canada, especially where there are special provincial laws.
A similar situation arose in Interprovincial Co-operatives Ltd. et.
al. v. The Queen in Right of Manitoba.11 4 In this case, the
defendants, operating in Ontario and Saskatchewan, discharged
mercury into waterways which flowed into Manitoba, causing
damage to the fishermen of province. Under a Manitoba law, the
Government compensated the fishermen, and became an assignee of
their rights. As such, the Government sued the defendants for the
damage suffered. They relied on a provision of the Manitoba law
which said that any lawful excuse in the province of discharge (the
defendants were licensed under Saskatchewan and Ontario law to
operate their plants) was not a defense to the action in Manitoba.
A whole paper could be written on the implications of this case.
In an over-simplification the court was split on the following lines.
Pigeon, Martland and Beetz stated that the legislation was directed
at acts outside the province and hence was invalid for the
extra-territorial effect. Only Parliament could legislate on such a
matter, and the rights therefore must be decided under common law.
On the same ground, the licenses in Saskatchewan and Ontario
could provide no justification outside their own territory. (This
would eliminate the need for a choice of law in interprovincial torts,
and it is unreasonable to suppose that either Parliament or the
Supreme Court would act here to impose special rules.) Ritchie,
concurring in the result rejected the above argument, upheld the
traditional approach of McLean, 1 5 and said that justification in
Ontario, in the form of the license, resulted in no action in
113. See Castel, Conflict of Laws (4th ed. Toronto: Butterworths, 1978) at c. 13
114. (1975), 53 D.L.R. (3d) 321 (S.C.C.)
115. [1945] S.C.R. 62
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Manitoba. Laskin, Spence, and Judson, in the dissent, would have
applied the Moran 1 6 aporoach, the substantial connection
approach, to the choice of law as well.
Thus, the solution to the second situation remains very much a
mystery. There are several factors, however, which argue against
the result above being applied in the defamation situation. The first
is, of course, that there being no clear ratio in the above case, it
would be restricted to its facts. The new composition of the
Supreme Court also adds another variable. As well, the
Interprovincia1 7 case deals with a negligence type tort, a very
different situation from defamation. In negligence, all elements of
the tort have equal weight. In defamation, it is the publication which
is the cause of action - "the making known of the defamatory
matter after it has been written (broadcast), to some person other
than the person of whom it is written (broadcast).11 8 In such a case,
the tort may be seen as totally arising in the province of publication,
without the problems of Interprovincial. Otherwise, one would
have to wait to see which approach from Interprovincial was
adopted. If Pigeon is adopted, the legislation would not apply and
common law would rule. If Laskin was followed, one would apply
the law of the place of the tort. In this, one would apply the
substantial connection to the choice of law and the court could
consider many factors, including the policies behind the various
laws.
Once one decides there is jurisdiction, and the law to be applied is
chosen, there are several other problems facing a court where there
is a multi-state publication. In a national broadcast, for instance,
injury to a national figure may occur in all ten provinces. It would
be possible that an action could take place in all ten jurisdictions.
However, there appears to be no need for this. A provincial court
appears to have the ability to award damages for publications
occurring in other provinces, as well as the province where action is
taken. 119 In considering the damages awarded, the court can
consider the extent of the publication. 120
116. [1975] 1 S.C.R. 393
117. (1975), 53 D.L.R. (3d) 321 (S.C.C.)
118. Gatley, supra, note 4 at 103
119. Hubert and International School of Music v. DeCamillis and Canadian
Accordion Institute Ltd. (1963), 44 W.W.R. I (B.C.S.C.)
120. Neeld et al. v. Western Broadcasting Co. Ltd. et al. (1976), 65 D.L.R. (3d)
574 (B.C.S.C.)
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The final aspect to be considered under jurisdiction is the joint
liability aspect. The position is perhaps best outlined as follows:
• . . that the publication of a libel, composed by one, printed by
another and distributed by a third, is a joint tort, with joint and
several liability, for which reason, where it is published in a
newspaper, the injured person may sue in the same action the
editor, proprietor, the printer and the publisher, or such of them
as he thinks fit, and that each is liable on the judgement for the
whole amount. 121
In a situation which merits, however, it might appear possible to sue
one joint tortfeasor in one province, and another in a second
province. The courts do not look lightly upon such a gold-digging
operation. Where there is a single commercial enterprise in which
the joint tortfeasors are involved, the courts will not permit a second
action in another province against one joint tortfeasor where
recovery has already been given against the rest in another
province. 122 Hence, the action against the distributor, who operated
in Ontario, was disallowed where recovery was obtained in
Manitoba on the same matter. However, another action would be
allowed in situations where the suit is brought against the individual
sellers of the books or magazines - as this is a separate tort and
publication. 123 (Unless they can claim they are innocent dis-
seminators). From this it might appear that individual broadcasting
stations could be sued in various provinces for a national broadcast.
However, the fact of the affiliation with the national network,
engaged in one commercial enterprise, may apply to find there was
a joint tort under Thomson v. Lambert, 124 and deny separate
recovery. In any event, relief may be provided under the Nova
Scotia Act, as recovery in another action in respect of publication of




Defamatory statements can and are published through the use of
radio and television. The special nature of these media create
special problems in relation to the law of defamation, and yet in
121. Popovich v. Lobay et al. (No. 2), [1937] 2 W.W.R. 523 (Man. C.A.)
122. Thomson v. Lambert, [1938] S.C.R. 253
123. Lambert and Lambert v. Roberts Drug Stores, Limited, [1933] 3 W.W.R.
508 (Man. C.A.)
124. [1938] S.C.R. 253
125. Defamation Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 72, s.5
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many instances, the age old law is applied to the new medium
without any critical analysis. There have been isolated judgements
recently in Canada which have begun to realize the special problems
that do exist, such as in the field of pleadings, news services and fair
comment. However, "there is surprisingly little Canadian or
English authority dealing with the problem in audio-visual
presentations succh as live theatre, motion pictures or television
broadcasts." 126 It can only be hoped that there will be continuing
recognition of the special characteristics as more and more cases
come to the courts.
However, there are already areas in which change, if considered
necessary, must come from the legislature, such as in areas of due
care, injunctions, and perhaps in relation to Parliamentary privilege.
Change is decidedly needed in the area of cable television.
However, with such change will come the constitutional problems
of the 'special' legislation. There is a strong argument that the
province is competent here, although conflicting federal legislation
may be paramount.
Other problems also exist which must be resolved by the courts.
The susceptibility of radio waves to transcend boundaries creates
many problems in jurisdiction and conflict of laws. The situation in
Canada is far from clear and needs clarification.
In all these areas, however, the prime concern should be the
recognition of the unique characteristics of radio and television.
Once that is recognized, perhaps many of the problems will be
overcome. As well, the way would be open for a developing law to
cope with new forms of communication which are sure to develop
with our fast advancing technology.
126. Lougheed v. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (1978), 4 C.C.L.T. 287
(Alta. S.C.)
